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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a mechanic's lien suit by a contractor against
the owner for the balance due on a construction contract.
The owner counter-claimed for alleged damages.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court awarded the contractor a judgment
in the amount of $6,316.95 which reflected offsets allowed
the owner in the amount of $699 .91. The trial court
denied the contractor a mechanic's lien and attorney's
fees. The owner's claim for damages in the cumulative
amount of $23,363.07 was denied except as to the offset
of $699.91.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent - Cross Appellant (the contractor) seeks
affirmance of the judgment rendered below except as to
the denial of a mechanic's lien and the denial of attorney's
fees, as to which two times, the respondent seeks a partial
reversal of the judgment with instruction to grant a mechanics' lien and attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellants' statement is contravened generally in that
it does not present a fair resume' of the evidence adduced
at the trial - which would have been helpful to the
Court in determining whether there is any substantial
evidence to support the judgment. On the contrary, it
presents none of the evidence favorable to the judgment
but only carefully extracted excerpts favorable to the appellants. Failure to present any of the evidence favorable
to the respondents makes that which is presented of questionable value. Douglas v. Duvall~ 5 Utah 2d 429, 304
P. 2d 373 ( 1956). Since respondents cannot concur in appellants' statement of the facts, the following statement
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of facts supported by the record is presented to serve as
a setting for the issues in the case.
By a lease agreement apparently executed in November, 1961, Reed M. Smith and his wife (the appellants
herein and hereinafter called the "owner") agreed to
construct and to lease to D. C. Stephens and his wife and
David C. Stephens and his wife (hereinafter called either
the "lessees" or by individual name) a building designed
as a laundry and dry cleaning center at 2095 East 13
South, Salt Lake City, Utah (except for a room about
1712 feet by 33 feet at the north end of the building which
was not covered by the lease) . (Exhibit 6)
Later, by a contract dated January 4, 1962, R. Derrell Ballard (hereinafter called the "contractor") agreed
to construct a laundry and dry cleaning building, the
design, plans and specifications for which has been prepared by Bruce J. McDermott, a Salt Lake City architect.
(Exhibit 1) The contract is on the A.I.A. Short Form
for Small Construction Contracts. It specifically provides
that work is to commence 90 days after receipt of notice
to commence work.
Under the contract, the east wall of the building
was to be spaced one full foot distant from a high retaining wall on the adjoining property immediately to the
east. (Exhibit 3)
Some delay was encountered in getting a buildingpermit. ( R. 26 7, line 1 ; R. 268, line 12) . Severe freezing
and inclement weather set in early in January. (R. 270,
line 26; R. 514, line 3; R. 525, line 19; Ex. 33 p. 3; Ex.
34 p. 26) By a letter of January 10, addressed to Mc-
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Dermott, receipt of which was admitted by the owner
( R. 104) the contractor asked for an extension of time
because of the weather and zoning problems. According
to the architect's supervisor on the job, Ernest Daniels,
this extension was granted. (R. 521, line 17; R. 524, line
24) No contradictory evidence was introduced by the
owner.
Immediately upon the first break in the weather
in early February, the contractor commenced construction
on the building. (R. 268, line 21) Things went along
according to the contract until after the footings were in
and the forms were prepared for the foundation in accordance with the contract specification that the east
wall have a foot of space between it and the adjacent
high retaining wall on the property next door. (Ex. 3)
At this juncture, in the contractor's absence, the
owner or the architect acting for him, orally interfered
with the workmen on the job, requiring them to shift the
building so that there would be only six inches between
the building and the right retaining wall instead of the
one full foot provided by the contract. (R. 345, line 15;
R. 306, line 19; R. 358, line 12; R. 320) (Ex. 1)
Under the contract plans, the electrical service hookup was to underground to a utility pole which the plans
showed to be on or within a foot or two of the north
property line. ( R. 244, line 22) In reality the pole was
from 10 to 12 feet over into the neighbor's property (R.
23; R. 244, line 25) Though requested to obtain an
easement for the underground line, as the contract required him to do, the owner did not obtain such an ease-
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ment. (Smiths' Deposition, p. 19) As a matter of necessity an overhead service, satisfactory to the architect
and the electrical engineer was installed. ( R. 246, lines
15, 28)
On or about April 20, 1962, the lessees commenced
installation of their fixtures in the building. (R. 262, line
14; R. 544, line 4)
The contract called for the north room of the building to be only "roughed-in." It was not initially under
lease to the Stephens nor to anyone else. According to
the owner, the contractor completed certain work called
for under the contract - specifically, at least, the tile
floor and he painting in this room - in late August or
early September, 1962. (R. 399, line 25; R. 493)
There is evidence to the effect that the owner's unauthorized move of the building to just one half of the
distance specified in the contract between the east wall
and the adjoining high retaining wall necessitated pouring the east foundation solid against the retaining wall.
( R. 280; R. 281, line 20) As a consequence, difficulty
was encountered in keeping water from seeping into the
building in the area along the joint line between the
foundation and the block wall on the east side of the
building. Several attempts were made by the contractor
to correct this problem. The owner also made attempts
to reduce the seepage although at one time he unfortunately used hot tar which flowed into the building rather
than setting in place. The cumulative effect of these efforts
was substantially, and there is evidence, to completely
eliminate the water seepage. One of the lessees testified
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that it was not coming through any more: "All I know
is that it is not coming in any more." ( R. 548, line 1 )
There was no evidence introduced which would indicate
that water is presently a problem.
The contractor testified that it was impossible to get
cooperation out of the owner with reference to matters
involved in the building, including but not limited to the
electrical service and the east wall. ( R. 46; R. 4 7 )
At one time the contractor sent a letter of intention
to terminate, but the record is clear, including the owner's own admissions that the contractor did not, in fact,
carry out the suggested termination. (R. 399, line 25; R.
493)
Eventually the contractor filed notice of a mechanic's
lien and brought suit for the balance due under the contract, $5,449.00 plus interest, for a lien and for attorney's
fees.
The owner counterclaimed claiming alleged damages
in the aggregate of $23,363.07.
At the trial conflicting evidence was introduced concerning all the major items and issues in controversy and
most of the minor ones.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CONTRACTOR IS ENTITLED TO
A MECHANICS' LIEN, A DECREE OF FORECLOSURE THEREOF AND TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES.
On October 18, 1962, the contractor recorded a
notice of a mechanic's lien.
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Of the many fact issues in the case, one that is really
not subject to controversy is the question of whether the
contractor performed work under the contract within he
statutory limit of 80 days prior to the date of filing of
his notime of lien. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 ( 1953) .
Reed M. Smith, the owner, testified unequivocably
that the contractor performed work under the contract
"in the latter part of August or the first part of September," in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: At any rate, for the cost of a vinyl
floor you could have rented it to this man for $150 a
month?
THE WITNESS: Except at that time Mr. Ballard
was still doing work on the job.
THE COURT:
building?

All right. Isn't that part of the

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
BY MR. SCHMID:

Q. What was he doing? He was putting vinyl floor
down, wasn't he, painting it?

A. He did, as I said before, in the latter part of August or the first part of September. ( R. 493)
The contractor's testimony corroborates that the
notice of lien was field within the statutory time limit.
(R. 274)
The dates within which the qualifying work must
have been done are the 30th of July to the 18th of Octo-
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ber. Clearly work done in August and September meets
that requirement.
One can only surmize that the denial of the mechanic's lien, foreclosure and attorney's fees resulted from some
concept of "fireside" equity. However, the statute is clear
and the lien should have been granted with the incidents
of foreclosure and attorney's fees which are the means
of enforcing the legislatively enunciated policy of protection for the contractor in situations such as this.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment must be reversed as to this aspect and remanded with instructions
to grant a mechanic's lien, decree of foreclosure on it,
and to award reasonable attorney's fees.
POINT II. ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THEY
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The owner's arguments that the judgment must be
reversed - including arguments about the east wall, alleged loss of rent and the listing of items on pages 21
and 22 of the appellants' brief - all fall into the same
category. The only issue involved is whether there is any
substantial, competent evidence, considering also all inferences properly deducible therefrom, taken in the light
most favorable to the judgment to support the judgment.
Culley v. Culley, 17 Utah 2d 62, 404 P. 2d 657 ( 1965);
Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P. 2d 101
( 1959).
The order of discussion herein will be the individual
items which is appears the owner is complaining about in
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his brief, itemized on pages 21 and 22 of his brief. Then
will follow a discussion and reference to the evidence
supporting the trial court's judgment as to the alleged
damages for the east wall and the alleged damages for
loss of rent.
Owner's item No. 1. This concerns the east wall
and will be discussed later.
Owner's item No. 2. Asphalt work in parking area.
The evidence is in conflict. Howard Kent, employee of
the lessee, testified to a minimal amount of asphalt difficulty - breakage equivalent only to about two large table
tops (referring to counsel tables in the court room). (R.
258, line 1) Eugene Bowers, engineer, manager of Bowers
Construction Company, testified that from his observations the patches covered about 100 to 150 square feet and
should have cost about 25 cents to 35 cents per square foot
if ready for asphalt and an additional ten cents per square
foot if not. (R. 572, line 14; R. 580, line 11) He estimated a price of about $25.00 ( R. 5 72, line 19) His
prices were based on the assumption a crew was available
in the area. (R. 583, line 14) He testified that from his
experience, cracking was not abnormal in asphalted areas.
( R. 582, line 1)
According to D. C. Stephens, one of the lessees, the
contractor had been persuaded to have the asphalt installed under wet conditions much against his better judgment. (R. 260, line 13) The owner testified that he had
had a strip 6 feet wide at the west end of the parking lot
asphalted, contending that the contractor was obligated
to do this under his contract ( R. 454, line 9; R. 466, line
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15) even though the evidence is otherwise indisputable
that the architect directed that asphalt not be insalled on
this strip. (R. 278, line 18) (Ex. 17) The owner further
admitted that at about the same time as he allegedly had
patching done on the parking lot under construction, he
also had asphalt work done on another parking lot of his
just across the street. (R. 461, line 16) He was directed
by the court to produce payment records for this contemporaneous asphalt work across the street. ( R. 461, line 28)
They were not produced.
Since there was ample evidence to support a finding
that the contractor was not liable for even the amount
allowed the owner, the owner is in no position to complain.
Owner's item No. 4. Breaking concrete - light standard. Although the owner testified to the payment and the
laborer testified to doing the work, there is nothing in
the record in any manner to show that this was work
which should have been done by the contractor, or if so
that he failed correctly to do it. To have awarded damages on the evidence adduced would have been error.
Owner's item No. 5. Welding and resetting light
standard. The owner's own witness tetified that the pole
had been hit by a truck making it out of true, requiring
repair (R. 442, line 9) but without any indication in the
record as to who hit it or when. To have allowed this
item would have been error.
Owner's item No. 7. Hauling broken concrete. The
record is devoid of any intimation that this is work which
the contractor should have done. To have allowed it would
have been error.
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Owner's item No. 9. Installing header box, moving
downspout. Although the owner testified to payment for
this alleged claim, the record is devoid of any evidence
to indicate that this was the contractor's obligation. (\\re
agreed however that $25.00 could be allowed) (R. 161)
(See item 12 below.)
Owner's item No. 10. Material and labor to fill in
lower ventilator openings. Like other assertions of the
owner, this is not only not borne out by the evidence but
it contradicted by the testimony of his own agents. Ernest
C. Daniels, draftsman-architect who supervised construction on behalf of the owner, testified that the ventilators
were properly installed by the contractor, but that later
they were moved because of gas fume seepage from the
service station on the adjoining property. (R. 520, lines
15, 17; R. 519, line 23)
Owner's item No. 12. Labor, Richard E. Long, painting sand trap cover, digging hole, cleanup. The record is
devoid of any evidence that these items were obligations
of the contractor. As to the light standard, the owner's
witness, Reynolds, testified that a truck had backed into
the light standard. (R. 442, line 9) (It would appear that
the $25 .00 allowed by the trial court under this item
probably was intended to have been allowed under item 9
above, but was inadvertently assigned to this one.)
Owner's item No. 13. Cleaning reflectors, rewiring
light standard. The owner's own witness testified that this
work, which was done in October, might have been
naturally required because of the nature of the lights and
their open reflectors. (R. 443, line 4)
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Owner's item No. 14. Cleaning sand traps. The owner testified that the lessee did this work voluntarily and
that his, the owner's, payment for it was equally voluntarily given. ( R. 296, line 20)
Owner's item No. 15. Plumbing bid to complete according to specifications. The owner's failure to specify
the components of this claim does not assist in discussing
it. Part of this aggregate amount appears to represent
claims based on alleged use of smaller than specified pipe.
It would appear that since there never has been any
complaint as to the adequacy of the water supply or
capability in the building, and that in fact a pressure reducer was installed by the lessee, that the trial court, for
these reasons of credibility, disallowed these aspects of
the claim. During construction, it was determined that
one specific length of pipe otherwise called for in the
specifications was not needed. This item, in the amount
of $83.10 was agreed to by the contractor and was allowed
by the trial court. Part of the rest of this claim appears
to be a claim for fittings allegedly eliminated and for labor
saved by the contractor. There is nothing in the record
to show where or what fittings, if any, were eliminated.
The trial court was correct in ignoring an unproven allegation. The same applies to the alleged claim for labor
savings to the contractor, plus the fact that the contractor
was not obligated to the owner to expend any specified
sums for labor. This again was properly denied by he trial
court. The balance of this unsegregated claim is apparently based on an assertion that the contractor was obligated
under the contract to use a larger water meter than was
installed by the city at the contractor's expense. At no
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time, however, has the architect complained of the water
meter. It is not on his check list. (Ex. 16) Chidester, the
owner's plumbing witness, first testified that a 1 Y2 " meter
was installed though the contract called for a 2" meter
(R. 411, line 19); however, after being given an opportunity to point out to the court where a 2" meter, or any
meter for that matter, was specified, he explained that the
specifications did not specify a 2" meter, and, in fact, did
not specify meter size at all. ( R. 416, line 27; R. 417, line
19) As a matter of fact, the expression "water meter" or
"meter" with reference to water, does not appear any
place in the contract, the plans or the specifications, to
the best of counsel's ability to search for such items. Since
the contract did not call for any given size water meter,
and the service is admittedly more than adequate - even
requiring a pressure reducer - it would have been error
for the trial court to have allowed this specious claim.
Owner's item No. 16. Difference between the cost
of overhead and underground wiring. As let, the contract
called for an underground electrical service to the building. The contract plans also showed the utility pole to be
on or within a couple of feet of the property line. (R. 244,
line 22) (Ex. 3) In fact, however, the utility pole was
some 10 to 12 feet over into the neighbor's property. (R.
244, line 25; R. 23) The contract required the owner to
obtain needed easements. (Ex. 1, Art. 5) He did not,
(Smith's deposition, page 19) although requested by the
contractor to do so. (R. 305, line 13) With full knowledge
and acquiescence of the architectural supervisor, the decision was made to use an overhead service since the owner
had failed to provide the easement for the underground
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service. ( R. 246, line 15) This was approved by the architect, the owner's agent. ( R. 246, line 28) In view of the
owner's breach of his obligation to provide the easement,
and the approval of the overhead service by his architect,
the trial court was correct in its denial of extra damages
which would simply have rewarded the owner for his
breach.
Owner's item No. 17. Items of credit agreed to by
the contractor and not allowed the (sic) court. In a less
serious and dignified setting, one mighty simply ask as to
this claim "Who is trying to fool whom?" for the simple
reason that the record reference cited by the owner refers
only to a letter of negotiation requesting payment long
prior to suit, on which letter the owner took no action. In
reality a credit of $194.00 was allowed. (Contract price,
$38,750. $33,107 paid. Amount claimed in suit is $5,449.
Credit difference is $194.00.)
Owner's item No. 18. Asphalt work .This item and
Item No. 1 deal with the east wall and the alleged damaged claimed relevant thereto, therefore this following
portion of the brief will treat all aspects of the east wall
claims, some of which are referred to in Point 4 of the
owner's brief.
Initially it should be pointed out that while there is
evidence that the east wall did leak near the foundation
at one time, the final and uncontradicted evidence from
the man most likely to know - the lessee - is that the
wall does not leak. David C. Stephens, lessee, testified,
"All I know is that it is not coming in any more. (R. 548,
line 1)
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However, if liability for difficulties with the east wall
is to be attributed to one of the parties, it must, under
the fact, be attributed to the owner whose breach of contract caused the difficulty. The contract called for the
contractor to build a building one foot distant from the
retaining wall on the adjacent property. It was on this
basis that bids were requested, made and the contract let.
Had the building been built according to the contract, the
difficulty would not have arisen. Instead, however, in the
contractor's absence, in gross bad faith and in clear breach
of his own contractual duties, the owner or the architect
acting at his request ordered a substantial, cardinal, and
material deviation from the contract terms by interfering
with the work in progress and orally ordering the construction crew to shift the building to only one half the
contract distance between it and the retaining wall - a
subsantial, a gross and completely intervening alteration.
(R. 320, lines 1-23; R. 345, line 15 and following; R. 306,
line 19; R. 358, line 12) This change was ordered orally,
in the contractor's absence even while the forms were
being constructed for the foundation after the footings had
been put in, without any prior notice to the contractor
even though it appears that both the owner and he architect knew, even at the time of letting the contract, that
they would eventually do this. (R. 345, line 25; Smith's
Deposition, p. 22) Such a substantial change, one not
complying with the terms of the contract, constitutes a
substantial breach of the contract by the owner for the
consequences of which he must be responsible.
There is competent evidence in the record that this
unauthorized change made double forming impossible,
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requiring only single forming, which was acquiesced in and
approved by the architectural supervisor. (R. 280; R. 281,
line 20)
Even assuming that the contractor should bear the
cost needed to insure waterproofing of the wall as a matter
of precaution, the trial court was generous in allowing
$150.00 for this because the uncontradicted, competent
evidence of experts is that it can properly be done for less.
Jack Duncan, a waterproofing expert with over 15 years
experience in this type of work testified that it could be
done for $85.00. ( R. 528, lines 3, 9; R. 529, lines 15-30)
He had done this type work successfully previously. ( R.
530, line 27) There would be no danger of erosion of the
mortar. (R. 533, lines 18, 30) It would actually withstand
several feet of hydrostatic pressure on the other side. (R.
538, line 14)
Lynn C. Layton, of Layton Roofing Company, with
over 30 years experience including waterproofing of walls,
testified that the waterproofing would cost no more than
$100.00. ( R. 554, through 556)
Eugene Bowers, general manager of Bowers Construction Company, a graduate of Annapolis Naval Academy with studies of water and the effect of hydrostatic
pressure (R. 568, lines 6-30; R. 569, line 5) and who had
had experience with similar leakage problems similarly
testified that the methods described by Mr. Duncan would
work very successfully. He had utilized similar experts and
methods to cure leakage problems even under an actual
hydrostatic head. ( R. 569, lines 8-16)
There is thus ample, substantial, competent evidence
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to support the judgment. To require tearing the wall
down and rebuilding it when the cause of the trouble lies
with the owner and can be corrected for a nominal sum
would be ludicrous travesty on justice. Bingham v. Stevenson, 420 P. 2d 839 (Mont. 1966); Williams v. Nall, 4
Ariz. App. 416, 420 P. 2d 988 ( 1966).
There is equally no merit to the owner's assertions
that it is entitled to alleged loss of rent because of unjustified delay in completing the building. The evidence
is all to the contrary.
While the lease between the owner and the lessee
provided that the owner would have the building "ready
for fixtures on or before April 1, 1962," (Ex. 6, p. 2) the
contract between the owner and the contractor which is
dated January 4 provided that the building would be
completed "ninety calendar (90) days after receipt of
notic eto commence work." (Ex. 1 ) There is no evidence
in the record of the date of any notice, if any was given,
to commence work given to the contractor despite the
specific requirement of the giving of notice.
The reference by the owner in his brief to the comment in the bidding instructions that work would commence five days after letting the contract is grossly misleading. The specifications, not he bidding insructions, are
part of the contract. It is elementary that the bidding instructions and information are superseded by the actual
contract, which in this case specifically and clearly called
for the giving of notice to commence in order to start the
clock running.
Even at that, the date for completion of the building
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on the part of the contractor would not have met the date
the owner had promised the lessees.
The evidence showed that there was a delay in getting a building permit. ( R. 26 7, line 1 ; R. 268, line 12)
Within a few days very inclement weather set in, so bad
that the ground froze solid. (R. 270, line 26; R. 514, line
3; R. 525, line 19; Ex. 33, 34 and 35. See particularly Ex.
33, p. 3 and Ex. 34, page 26, which have "Daily Soil Temperatures" charts showing that the ground was frozen from
about the first of January, reaching a depth of 20 inches
by January 12 and remaining frozen to this depth until the
12th of February.)
The evidence shows that during this time, by a letter
dated January 10, 1962, and received by McDermott on
or before January 12, 1962 (Request for admissions in
file, R. 104), the contractor requested an extension of time
because of the weather and the zoning problems. There
is competent evidence that the extension was granted. ( R.
521, lines 17, 23; R. 524, line 24). There is no contradictory evidence. By about mid-February the ground had
thawed sufficiently to permit commencement of construction. ( R. 268, line 21 )
By about April 20, the lessees commenced installing
their fixtures. ( R. 262, line 14; R. 544, line 4)
Before discussing the effect of the terms of the lease
between the owner and the lessees, it must be noted that
there is no evidence from anyone that the contractor was
informed of he specific monetary, and particularly the
specific "penalty" provisions of the lease until litigation
developed.
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However, under the terms of the lease - unknown to
the contractor-the lessees were to pay the owner $100.00
per month (apparently commencing December 1, 1961)
until the "proposed building is finished and ready for occupancy." The building shall be considered as ready for
occupancy on the first of the calendar month after the
month in which the building is completed in accordance
with the paragraph CONSTRUCTION and after posession thereof has been tendered to LESSEE." (emphasis
added) (Ex. 6) The CONSTRUCTION paragraph of
the lease provides that "The construction shall be completed by SMITH ready for fixtures on or before April 1,
1962." It then further provides, as between the owner and
the lessees, that if the building is not completed on the
specified date (April 1), then the owner shall pay a penalty to the lessees of $20.00 per day until the advance rentals are thereby absorbed. The regular rent on the laundry
and dry cleaning portion of the building was to be $525.00
per month.
There is evidence that the lessees made the following
payments:
December 1, 1961
January 2, 1962
February 1, 1962
February 28, 1962
April 2, 1962

$100.00
$100.00
$100.00
$100.00
$100.00
(This even though the
lease provisions specified that the building
should be ready by
April 1)
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June 1, 1962
July 2, 1962

$ 25.00
$525.00

The following then appears to be the time schedule
of events:
December 1, 1961
January 2, 1962
January 4, 1962
January 10, 1962

January 19, 1962
February 1, 1962
February 11, 1962
February 28, 1962
April 2, 1962
April 20, 1962
May
May
June
June
July

12, 1962
29 or
1, 1962
1, 1962
1, 1962

$100.00 advance rent paid.
$100.00 advance rent paid.
Contract let.
Contractor's request for extension of time because of
weather and zoning.
Building permit granted.
$100.00 advance rent paid.
Thaw permitted start of construction.
$100.00 advance rent paid.
$100.00 advance rent paid.
Lessees commenced installing
fixtures.
90 days from February 11.
opened to public.
$ 25 .00 rent paid by lessees.
$525.00 rent paid by lessees.
Lesse~s

The lease frankly denominated the $20.00 per day
as a "penalty" which, as such, would not have been enforcable by the lessees against the owner. It was not liquidated damages, nor were these terms even known to the
contractor.
There is ample, substantial evidence to support the
trial court's denial of loss of rent on this portion of the
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building on any of several theories. These include but
need not be limited to the setting in of weather so inclement as to preclude construction until in February; or the
fact that no notice to commence was ever given; or the
extension granted by the architect; or that it was within
the owner's power - with reference to the lessees - to
determine when he would deem the building completed
for the purposes of rent payment; or that the terms of the
lease were not disclosed to the contractor and therefore
he is not liable for special damages, even if enforceable
between the parties.
In any event, since the lessees commenced installing
their fixtures on or about April 20, 1962, the owner was
entitled to start collecting rent on May 1, with no loss
to himself.
Under these circumstances it cannot be said that
there is not substantial, competent evidence to support the
trial court's denial of damages for loss of rent on the
laundry and dry cleaning portion of the building.
Equally, there is no basis for assessing loss of rent as
to the small north room of the building. This portion was
only to be "roughed-in" by the contractor. All that might
have prevented the owner from leasing this room assuming a renter - was the tile on the floor and paint,
according to the owner's testimony. (R. 401, lines 16-22)
According to the owner, the contractor did this remaining
contract work in the last of August or the first of September. (R. 399, line 25) Even then it was not rented until
in November. (R. 398, line 4)
As the judge stated during the trial, the owner could
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not sit back and charge the contractor for rent when a
small expenditure for tile and paint would have put the
room in a rentable condition. (R. 398, line 28; R. 401,
line 25; R. 402, line 2) Even at that, there is no evidence
that the owner actually could have rented it on any specific terms.
POINT III. THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE CONTENTION THAT THE CONTRACTOR WAS
REQUIRED TO PLEAD AND PROVE CERTIFICATION BY THE ARCHITECT AS A CONDITION OF RECOVERY BY SUIT.
A careful reading of the terms of the contract does
not indicate that the decisions of the architect are either
the only means whereby the contractor can obtain pay
nor are they final and conclusive on anybody. Under
Article 18 of the General Conditions the decisions of the
architect are not only not final and conclusive on anybody, but they are specifically even subject to arbitration.
(Ex. 1)
The authorities cited by the appellant actually support the position that "(T) he court should not imply an
agreement to submit to an architect or engineer matters
arising under a building or construction contract, but
should require clear and express language, because it is
contracting away the right of the parties to appeal to the
courts of justice in case of controversy," Anno.J 54 A.L.R:
1255, 1256; Central Trust Co. v. LouisvilleJ St. L. & T. R.
Co.J 70 Fed. 282, 285 ( 1895). As expressed in Jefferson
Hotel Co. v. BrumbauchJ 168 Fed. 867 (1909), "Where
the stipulation does not provide that the decision of the
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engineer shall be final and conclusive, it is merely prima
facie evidence of the matters decided."
But to make such a certificate or decision conclusive
requires plain language in the contract. It is not to be
implied. Anno. 54 A.L.R. 1255; Ryan v. Curlew Irrig. &
Reservoir Co., 36 Utah 382, 104 Pac. 218 (1912).
Since there is no language in the contract purporting
to make the decision of the architect a condition precedent
to payment or recovery by suit, or final and conclusive,
these arguments of the appellant, not pleaded or raised
below, are nonpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the respondents respectfully pray this Court to issue its order:
1. Directing the trial court to grant a mechanic's
lien, foreclosure thereof, and reasonable attorney's fees to
the respondent-contractor.
2. And otherwise to affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
NESLEN AND 1-iOCK
1000 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
By ROBERT L. SCHMID
Attorneys for the Respondents
and Cross Appellants

